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Abstract As red tape in host countries and information asymmetries constitute a 
significant obstacle to investment flows across international borders, an important 
policy question is: what can aspiring FDI destinations do to reduce such barriers? This 
study uses newly collected data on 124 countries to examine the effects of investment 
promotion on inflows of US FDI. We test whether sectors explicitly targeted by 
investment promotion agencies in their efforts to attract FDI receive more investment 
in the post-targeting period, relative to the pre-targeting period and non-targeted 
sectors. The results of our analysis are consistent with investment promotion leading 
to higher FDI flows to countries in which red tape and information asymmetries are 
likely to be severe. The data suggest that investment promotion works in developing 
countries but not in industrialized economies. 
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1. Introduction 
Countries around the globe compete fiercely to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Policy 
makers believe that FDI can contribute to a faster economic growth by bringing additional 
capital, creating jobs, and transferring new technologies and know-how across international 
borders. Recent empirical evidence suggests that FDI may also lead to positive productivity 
spillovers to local firms, particularly in the supplying industries.1
This paper argues that investment promotion may be a cost-effective way of increasing FDI 
inflows, particularly to developing countries where information about business conditions is 
less readily available and bureaucratic procedures tend to be more burdensome. The purpose 
of investment promotion is to reduce transaction costs facing foreign investors by providing 
information (on business opportunities, prevailing laws and regulations as well as factor cost 
in a host country) and helping foreign investors deal with bureaucratic procedures. Investment 
promotion is a widespread but a relatively new phenomenon. In 2001, there existed more than 
160 national and over 250 sub-national investment promotion agencies (IPAs) (UNCTAD 
2001). The 2005 Census of Investment Promotion Agencies conducted by the World Bank 
revealed that 85 percent of the responding IPAs in developing countries were established in 
1980 or later (see 
 Given these potential 
benefits of FDI inflows, an important question for policy makers is how to attract foreign 
investors. 
Figure 1). 
This study aims to rigorously assess the effectiveness of investment promotion activities by 
examining three questions: (i) does investment promotion lead to higher FDI inflows? (ii) is 
there evidence that information provision and assistance with bureaucratic procedures are 
important channels through which investment promotion works? (iii) how do the costs of 
investment promotion compare to the benefits it brings?  
Our study was made possible by the availability of new data that we collected through a 
worldwide Census of Investment Promotion Agencies conducted under the aegis of the World 
Bank. The data set is unique in terms of the extent of its coverage and the level of detail. The 
data set includes information on investment promotion efforts (or the lack thereof) in 124 
countries, representing all income groups and geographic regions. About three quarters of 
responses pertain to developing countries. An extremely useful feature of the Census is that it 
includes time-varying information specifying which sectors were given priority by IPAs in 
their investment promotion efforts.  
Our identification strategy relies on the fact that the majority of IPAs target particular sectors 
in their efforts to attract FDI. Sector targeting is considered to be best practice by investment 
promotion professionals (Loewendahl 2001, Proksch 2004). It also allows us to identify the 
effect of investment promotion using a difference-in-differences approach. We compare FDI 
inflows into targeted sectors, before and after targeting, to FDI inflows into non-targeted 
sectors during the same time period. Our analysis is based on data on US outward FDI, 
disaggregated by host country and sector and available for the period 1990-2004, provided by 
the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. We control for changes in host country business 
environment by including country-year fixed effects, for heterogeneity of sectors in different 
locations by including country-sector fixed effects and for shocks to supply of FDI in 
particular sectors by adding sector-time fixed effects. The ability to control for all these 
factors enables us to credibly identify the effects of investment promotion.  
As sector targeting is a choice of the IPA, the targeting decision could be a response to earlier 
experience of the sector, which could present a reverse causality problem. However, when we 
exclude countries that reported in the Census that the targeting decision was based on the past 
success or failure in attracting FDI to the sector, our results hold. In addition, we find no 
evidence suggesting that targeting took place in sectors with relatively high or low inflows in 
                                               
1 See studies by Javorcik (2004a), Blalock and Gertler (2007), Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008, 2009, 
2010); and literature reviews by Görg and Strobl (2001) and Görg and Greenaway (2004). 
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the years preceding targeting. Finally, a strict exogeneity test does not reject our empirical 
strategy. 
Our results suggest that investment promotion efforts lead to higher FDI inflows. Investment 
promotion appears to be more effective in countries where English is not an official language 
and in countries which are more culturally distant from the US. Investment promotion also 
works better in countries with less effective governments, higher corruption and a longer time 
period required to start a business or obtain a construction permit. All of these findings are 
consistent with investment promotion alleviating problems associated with the scarcity of 
information and cumbersome bureaucratic procedures. Further, when we split the sample into 
industrialized and developing countries we find that investment promotion has a positive 
impact on FDI inflows in the developing world but not in industrialized countries. This is 
consistent with the observation that information and bureaucratic permits tend to be harder to 
obtain in a developing country setting. Finally, even within the subsample of developing 
countries, we confirm that investment promotion works better in places with higher 
information asymmetries and more red tape. 
The result that investment promotion is more effective in the presence of information 
asymmetries or more complex bureaucratic procedures is an interesting finding in its own 
right. Moreover, showing that investment promotion works better where we would expect it 
to do so suggests that we are indeed capturing the effects of IPA efforts rather than something 
else. 
Our analysis allows us to conduct a back-of-the-envelope cost-benefit calculation. On the 
benefit side, we find that targeted sectors receive more than twice as much FDI as non-
targeted sectors in developing countries. This magnitude is plausible, given that many sectors 
receive small amounts of FDI in absolute terms. For instance, during the period covered by 
our study the median sector-level inflow of US FDI to developing countries that received 
some US investment was 11 million dollars. Thus, an increase of 155 percent estimated in our 
analysis would translate into additional 17 million dollars of FDI flowing into a targeted 
sector. On the cost side, we rely on the 2004 budget figures obtained from the Census and 
find that an average IPA spent 90,000 dollars per sector targeted. Combining the benefit and 
the cost side, we conclude a dollar spent on investment promotion leads to 189 dollars of FDI 
inflows. In other words, bringing a dollar of FDI inflows costs half a cent in investment 
promotion expenditures.  
In an alternative exercise, we focus on the cost of creating a new job in a foreign affiliate. 
This is also a relevant metric as most policy makers care about creating employment and 
recent research shows that foreign affiliates tend to pay higher wages than domestic firms 
even when worker characteristics are taken into account (see, for instance, Lipsey and 
Sjöholm 2004, Almeida 2007). Using a data set on employment in US affiliates abroad, we 
find that targeted sectors see a 68 percent increase in affiliate employment relative to non-
targeted sectors. This translates into additional 1,159 jobs for the average sector or 78 dollars 
per job created.  
Our cost-benefit calculations should be treated with caution. On the one hand, these 
calculations capture only the effect of targeting on flows of FDI from the US. As investment 
promotion is likely to have a similar impact on investors from other source countries, our 
analysis underestimates the benefits of investment promotion activities. On the other hand, 
there may be other factors which contribute to the success of investment promotion and 
whose costs we are not taking into account (for instance, priority sectors may be awarded 
access to accelerated bureaucratic procedures). Finally, one needs to stress that our analysis 
captures the average, not the marginal, effect. Thus we are not suggesting that a large increase 
in investment promotion spending on the part of countries already engaged in such practice 
will lead to spectacular increases in FDI inflows. Rather, we interpret our results as 
suggesting that countries not engaged in investment promotion may benefit from such 
activities. 
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A series of robustness checks further supports our conclusions. First, we demonstrate that 
inclusion of country-sector specific time trends has no effect on our conclusions. Second, we 
show that the results hold if we exclude services sectors and utilities. This makes us confident 
that our findings are not driven by simultaneous opening to FDI and targeting of services 
industries where entry of foreign investors was restricted in the past. Third, we demonstrate 
that controlling for the past stock of FDI, a proxy for agglomeration effects, does not affect 
the estimated coefficients. Fourth, to address the concern that FDI flows may be a poor 
reflection of actual activities of foreign investors (Lipsey 2007), we demonstrate that our 
results hold if we use sales or employment of US affiliates abroad as our dependent variable. 
Finally, to give us confidence that we are capturing the benefits of investment promotion in 
the form of information provision and help with bureaucratic procedures, we examine 
whether the effect of targeting is stronger in the presence of financial or fiscal incentives. This 
does not appear to be the case. Our conclusion is further supported by the fact that there is no 
evidence that targeting of the same sector by other countries in the same geographic region 
leads to a diversion of FDI flows. 
Our study is related to two distinct literatures. The first one is the literature evaluating the 
effects of industrial policies. Within this literature, the strand most relevant to our work 
focuses on investment promotion. The few existing studies on this subject produce mixed 
conclusions. While Bobonis and Shatz (2007) and Charlton and Davis (2006) provide 
evidence suggesting that investment promotion is associated with higher FDI inflows, Head, 
Ries and Swenson (1999) do not find any significant effect of investment promotion efforts.2
Our paper differs from the existing studies in several respects. First, we explicitly focus on 
whether investment promotion is more effective in countries where information asymmetries 
tend to be greater and bureaucratic procedures more burdensome. Examining this question 
was not possible in the earlier studies which focused on FDI flows to US states, which are 
very homogenous in terms of availability of information on business conditions, or OECD 
countries among which differences may be limited.
  
3 In contrast to these studies, we use a 
broad sample of both developed and developing economies, which not only gives us a lot of 
variation in terms of potential information asymmetries but also makes our results more 
general. Second, we conduct a cost-benefit calculation in order to shed some light on whether 
the fruits of investment promotion are worth the expenditure.4
A related strand of studies examines the effectiveness of export promotion efforts. Again, the 
results appear to be mixed. Bernard and Jensen (2004) do not find a statistically significant 
relationship between expenditures of US states on export promotion and export market 
 And third, we take into account 
investment promotion activities of competing host countries. 
                                               
2 Head, Ries and Swenson (1999) estimate a location choice model on a sample of 760 Japanese 
manufacturing establishments in the US between 1980 and 1992. The findings show that the presence 
of a state investment promotion office in Japan does not have a statistically significant effect on entry 
of Japanese investors. In contrast, Bobonis and Shatz (2007), who analyze determinants of the FDI 
stock in US states from eight source countries using Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data estimator, 
reach the opposite conclusion. They measure investment promotion with the number of years a state 
had a full-time state trade or investment office in each of the eight countries and find that a one-percent 
increase in the number of years with an investment office increases the FDI stock by between 0.14 and 
0.27 percent. Charlton and Davis (2006) use data on FDI inflows into 19 industries in 22 OECD 
countries during the 1990-2001 period combined with information on targeted industries. Using 
propensity score matching and the difference-in-differences specification, the authors show that 
targeting of an industry increases the growth rate of FDI inflows into that industry by 41 percent. 
3 For instance, Head et al. (1999, p. 209) state “Promotion offices, like other forms of advertising, 
would be more likely to work when investors have little information about the choices they face. The 
low efficacy of this policy suggests that Japanese investors may already be well-informed about [US] 
state characteristics and therefore unswayed by the information the offices provide.” 
4 For a very useful case study evidence of benefits and costs associated with investment promotion 
efforts see Moran (2009). 
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participation of US firms based in that state. Using Irish data, Görg, Henry and Strobl (2007) 
show that large enough government export grants encourage existing exporters to compete 
more effectively on the international market but find little evidence that grants encourage 
non-exporters to start exporting. Using cross-country data, Lederman, Olarreaga and 
Payton (2010) conclude that export promotion agencies have on average a strong and 
statistically significant impact on exports.5,6
The second literature relevant to our study postulates that information asymmetries and poor 
business climate constitute a significant obstacle to capital flows across international borders. 
Information asymmetries between domestic and foreign investors have been put forward as a 
possible explanation for home bias, the tendency of investors to invest less in foreign equities 
relative to the prediction of a portfolio choice model (Stulz 1981, Ahearne, Griever, and 
Warnock 2005). The negative effects of information asymmetries on capital flows have been 
documented in empirical studies (Portes et al. 2001, Portes and Rey 2005, Gelos and Wei 
2005). Moreover, Daude and Fratzscher (2008) have shown that FDI flows are “substantially 
more sensitive to information frictions than investment in portfolio equity and debt 
securities.” Information asymmetries are the reason why Bond and Samuelson (1986) 
conclude in their theoretical contribution that high-productivity countries should use tax 
holidays as signals in their efforts to attract FDI. For the same reason, the theoretical model of 
Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) suggests that a capital-importing country could raise welfare 
by subsidizing foreign direct investment and other capital inflows from abroad.
 
7 The negative 
impact of corruption on investment flows has been documented in a number of studies 
including Wei (2000a, 2000b), Javorcik (2004b) and Javorcik and Wei (2009), just to name a 
few.8
This study is structured as follows. Section 2 focuses on the role of investment promotion in 
an investor’s decision making process. The empirical strategy and the data are described in 
Section 3. Section 4 discusses the results, while the last section presents the conclusions.  
 
 
2. Role of investment promotion 
2.1 What is investment promotion? 
Wells and Wint (2000) define investment promotion as activities through which governments 
aim to attract FDI inflows. These activities encompass: advertising, investment seminars and 
missions, participation in trade shows and exhibitions, distribution of literature, one-to-one 
direct marketing efforts, facilitating visits of prospective investors, matching prospective 
investors with local partners, help with obtaining permits and approvals, preparing project 
proposals, conducting feasibility studies and servicing investors whose projects have already 
become operational. Their definition of promotion excludes granting incentives to foreign 
investors, screening potential investment projects and negotiations with foreign investors, 
even though some IPAs may also be engaged in such activities. 
Investment promotion activities can be grouped into four areas: (i) national image building, 
(ii) investment generation, (iii) investor servicing, and (iv) policy advocacy. Image building 
activities aim to build a perception of the country as an attractive location for foreign direct 
investment. Investment generation involves identifying potential investors who may be 
                                               
5 In a related study, Rose (2007) finds that the presence of foreign diplomatic missions is positively 
correlated with exports to the country where the mission is located. 
6 Industrial policies, even if effective, may have some downsides. Ades and Di Tella (1997) warn that 
corruption tends to be higher in countries pursuing industrial policies. 
7 For an analysis focusing on import-substituting FDI see Raff and Srinivasan (1998). 
8 Our study is also related to the literature on general determinants of FDI inflows, which is, however, 
too large to be reviewed here. For a recent survey of the literature see Blonigen and Wang (2004). 
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interested in establishing a presence in the country, developing a strategy to contact them and 
starting a dialogue with the purpose of having them commit to an investment project. Investor 
servicing involves assisting committed investors in analyzing business opportunities, 
obtaining permits and approvals for establishing a business in the host country and 
maintaining business operations. Policy advocacy encompasses initiatives aiming to improve 
the quality of the investment climate and identifying the views of private sector in this area.  
Investment promotion practitioners believe that the most effective way of attracting FDI is to 
focus on a few priority sectors (so called targeting) rather than attempt to attract all types of 
foreign investors. Thus, an agency not engaged in targeting will promote its country as a good 
place to do business, while an IPA targeting particular sectors will emphasize why its country 
is an ideal location for investors operating in these industries. Similarly, the former IPA will 
attend many different types of fairs and conferences while the latter will present only at 
events specific to the industries it aims to attract. The idea behind targeting is that a more 
focused message tailored and delivered to a narrow audience will be more effective than 
general investment promotion activities. 
 
2.2 How can investment promotion affect the decision process of a 
potential investor?9
A company that has decided to engage in FDI usually starts the process of selecting the 
investment location by drawing a long list of potential host countries. The list is put together 
by the company executives or by a consulting firm hired for the purpose of site selection. The 
long list typically includes 8 to 20 countries which can be thought of as belonging to three 
groups: (i) most popular FDI destinations in the world, (ii) countries located in proximity to 
the existing operations of the investor, and (iii) emerging FDI destinations (that is, countries 
that the investor may not be initially very serious about but which represent “out of the box” 
thinking). The inclusion of the third category presents an opportunity for IPAs. The potential 
investor or the consulting firm working on its behalf is likely to include in the third group 
countries whose advertisements they have recently seen in international media, countries 
whose IPAs have recently approached them or their colleagues, or countries whose IPA 
representatives they have met at conferences and industry fairs.
 
10
Based on the trade-off between costs and the quality of business environment, the long list is 
narrowed down to a short list of up to 5 potential host countries. This is usually done without 
visiting the potential host countries, so the accessibility of the information about the business 
conditions in a host country plays a crucial role. IPAs that provide up-to-date, detailed and 
accurate data on their websites and IPAs that are willing to spend time preparing detailed 
answers to investors’ inquiries and customize these answers to the needs of an individual 
investor can increase the chances of their countries being included in the short list.  
  
The next step in the decision-making process involves visiting the countries included in the 
short list. This can be done by the potential investor, consultants or both. Multiple sites in 
each country may be visited. A visit often involves interactions with an IPA which has the 
opportunity to emphasize the advantages of locating in its country, answer questions, show 
executives potential investment sites or introduce them to potential local business partners.  
In the final stage of the process, the foreign investor chooses an investment location based on 
the availability of potential sites, costs, the overall quality of business climate and availability 
                                               
9 This subsection draws on MIGA (2006) and the authors’ interviews with former professional 
consultants assisting companies in establishing facilities abroad. 
10 For instance, the Polish IPA believes that TV advertising spots abroad increased the number of 
visitors to its website by 43 percent in 2006 (source: Dziennik online. “Wielka promocja rozpoczeta. 
Polska jak proszek do prania” December 29, 2006.  
http://www.dziennik.pl/Default.aspx?TabId=97&ShowArticleId=26406). 
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of incentives. An IPA can assist in providing information on incentives and prevailing 
regulations (for instance, labor law), helping with the registration process and compliance 
with other applicable bureaucratic requirements (for example, obtaining construction permits, 
appropriate licenses and work permits for expatriate staff). 
As evident from the above outline, IPAs can play a significant role in the selection process of 
FDI sites and the process of establishing a foreign affiliate. The national IPA is often the first 
entity contacted by a potential investor in order to obtain information. Absence of an IPA not 
only increases the investor’s cost of gathering information but may also constitute a reason to 
eliminate a location during the selection process. An IPA is also a key partner of a foreign 
investor during the actual investment process. It often serves as an intermediary between the 
investor and the national or local government agencies. A well-functioning IPA can to some 
extent compensate for deficiencies of the bureaucracies in its country. 
 
3. Empirical strategy and data 
3.1 Empirical strategy 
Our identification strategy relies on the fact that most IPAs focus their efforts on a certain 
number of priority (targeted) sectors. Sector targeting is viewed by investment promotion 
practitioners as best practice, as it is believed that more intense efforts concentrated on a few 
priority sectors are likely to lead to greater FDI inflows than less intense across-the-board 
attempts to attract FDI. Thus in our empirical analysis we use a difference-in-differences 
approach and ask whether targeted sectors receive higher FDI inflows in the post targeting 
period, relative to the pre-targeting period and non-targeted sectors. More specifically, we 
estimate the following model: 
 
ln (FDI inflowcit) = α0 + β0 Post targeting cit + γci + γct + γit + εcit    (1) 
 
The dependent variable is the log of inflow of foreign direct investment into sector i in 
country c at time t. Post targeting cit equals one if country c targets sector i at time t and zero 
otherwise. γci, γct and γit are country-industry, country-year and industry-year fixed effects, 
respectively. Time-invariant characteristics that differentiate sectors chosen for targeting from 
other sectors will be captured by country-sector fixed effects (so there is no need to include a 
dummy for targeted sectors). Shocks common to all sectors in a particular country in a 
particular year will be captured by country-year fixed effects (so there is no need to include a 
dummy for the post-targeting period). Shocks affecting supply of FDI in a particular sector 
will be controlled for by sector-year fixed effects. The model will be estimated on a sample of 
countries that have or have not practiced sector targeting. Narrowing the sample to only 
countries engaged in targeting does not change the conclusions of the study. 
We will also aim to shed light on channels through which investment promotion works. In an 
extended specification, we will examine whether the effects of targeting differ depending on 
the host country characteristics. In particular, we will focus on proxies that capture difficulties 
with obtaining information on the host country or/and doing business in the host country: 
 
ln (FDI inflowcit) = α1+ β1Post targeting cit +β2 Post targeting cit*Information 
asymmetryc +  β3 Post targeting cit *Transaction costsc + γci + γct + γit + εcit   (2) 
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We anticipate that in countries where information asymmetries are likely to be greater and 
transaction costs higher, investment promotion will be more effective (i.e., β2 and β3 will be 
positive). 
 
3.2 Econometric issues 
Identifying the relationship between investment promotion efforts and FDI inflows poses 
some challenges. Perhaps the most important challenge is establishing the direction of 
causality. It could be argued that the choice of sectors to be targeted is endogenous; IPAs 
could be targeting sectors which already experienced high inflows or are likely to do so in the 
future. In the Census, IPAs were asked about who decided which sectors to target.11
What determined the choice of priority sectors? According to the data collected through the 
Census, priority sectors were overwhelmingly chosen as part of the country’s efforts to 
develop these industries—this answer was given by 82 respondents. 34 respondents 
mentioned that past success in attracting FDI was a factor, while 6 said it was part of a 
national strategy plan. Other answers included: the country having a comparative advantage 
in the sector (5 respondents), availability of raw materials (2), spare capacity in the sector (1), 
efforts to develop linkages (1), global FDI trends (1), increased potential to earn foreign 
exchange (1), local expertise in the sector (1), import substitution strategy (1) and the success 
of other countries in the region (1). 
 The 
incentive to target sectors that already have high expected FDI inflows may have been present 
at the agency board level, but it is harder to make the same case for other entities involved. Of 
the 97 agencies that responded, only 6 said the decision was entirely left to the agency board, 
24 reported the board having some input into the decision, and 67 said the agency board was 
not at all involved in the decision. Since the majority of the countries in the sample responded 
that the agency board was not involved in the choice of sectors, we do not view this 
possibility as a cause for concern.  
We use five different strategies to deal with the potential reverse causality problem. First, we 
include country-industry fixed effects which take out unobserved time-invariant 
characteristics specific to country-industry combinations. If, for example, the mining sector in 
South Africa was chosen for targeting because of the endowment of gold and this endowment 
is also the reason for large FDI inflows into the sector, this is controlled for by the country-
sector fixed effect. Country-industry fixed effects will also allow us to control for the 
country’s comparative advantage in a given sector. Second, we show that our results are 
robust to a specification with first, second and third lags. A change in FDI inflows is unlikely 
to explain a change in policy which precedes it, although the strategy is not robust to forward-
looking behavior of policy makers. Third, we investigate whether the sectors targeted were 
different from other sectors in the years before the targeting started. We find no evidence of 
relatively successful or unsuccessful sectors (in terms of attracting FDI) being chosen for 
targeting. Fourth, we show that the results hold even if we exclude targeted sectors in 
countries that made targeting decisions based on the past success or failure in attracting FDI 
to that sector. Finally, we perform a strict exogeneity test suggested by Wooldridge (2002, p. 
285) and show that it does not reject our empirical strategy. 
Another challenge in our analysis is to distinguish the effect of an IPA from other changes in 
policies (or anything else relevant for FDI inflows) occurring at the same time. We address 
this challenge by including country-year fixed effects which capture country-specific factors 
that may influence FDI inflows at a particular point in time. For instance, if country c started 
special investment promotion efforts in the automotive sector in year t and at the same time 
simplified registration procedures for foreign investors, to the extent that the latter reform 
                                               
11 The entities involved in the decision were: president’s office, prime minister’s office, ministry of 
foreign affairs, ministry of finance, ministry of industry, ministry of commerce, agency board or the 
decision was based on a national strategy plan. In some cases, several entities were involved.  
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affected all sectors equally, it would be captured by the country-year fixed effect. We also 
include sector-time fixed effects to capture factors affecting worldwide supply of FDI in a 
particular sector at a particular point in time. These fixed effects capture global unobserved 
sector-specific shocks. For example, if international investors suddenly decided to increase 
investments in the ICT sector, and a country at the same time started targeting the ICT sector, 
the investment promotion variable could capture the global shock rather than the country’s 
promotion efforts. Inclusion of sector-year fixed effects takes care of this possibility. We also 
show that our results are not affected by inclusion of country-sector-specific time trends or 
geographic region-sector-year fixed effects. 
 
3.3 Data 
Our data on investment promotion activities come from the 2005 Census we conducted under 
the aegis of the World Bank’s Research Department and in cooperation with the Foreign 
Investment Advisory Services, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and the World 
Association of Investment Promotion Agencies. An electronic survey was sent out to all 
national investment promotion agencies around the world. After several weeks reminder e-
mails were sent out, and after some more weeks phone calls were made to increase the 
likelihood of responding. As the survey forms came in, the data were carefully checked for 
inconsistencies and missing information. Then new rounds of phone calls were made to 
clarify inconsistencies and complete the data. The survey was sent out in December 2005, and 
by April 2006 most of the information was complete. The survey form gave uniformity 
needed for comparison across countries, while the information collected through the phone 
calls provided guidance on interpretation of the responses. This comprehensive process 
yielded responses from 97 national investment promotion agencies. The sample covers 
countries across all geographic regions as well as all income levels.  Seventy three of the 
responses received were from developing countries. The sample also includes an additional 
27 countries that we regard as very likely to not have an investment promotion agency. These 
were identified by their absence in different directories of IPAs, lack of websites, by 
confirmation of national embassies/other national public institutions or by consultations with 
World Bank country economists. Thus in total, we consider 124 countries. 
A potential concern is that high quality agencies are overrepresented in the sample due to self-
selection. We cannot rule out this possibility completely, but a glance at our sample reveals a 
wide representation of countries across all income groups and regions. Also our experience 
from collecting the data suggests the opposite. Some developed countries were among the 
hardest to obtain answers from, while countries in, for example, Sub-Saharan Africa were 
often extremely helpful in providing as extensive and precise information as possible. 
Therefore, it is not clear which way a potential sample bias would work. If anything, it could 
make investment promotion appear less efficient than it actually is.   
In the design of the survey, special attention was given to collecting time-varying sector-
specific information on investment promotion activities. Agencies were asked if they targeted 
specific sectors and when targeting started and ended. While this increased the effort needed 
to collect the data, it allowed for making comparisons within countries and controlling for 
country-sector-specific heterogeneity.12
Our sample covers 124 countries.
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12 One may be concerned about the quality of the recall information for the initial period of the sample. 
However, restricting the analysis to the last decade of the data (1995-2004) does not change the 
conclusions of the study. 
 This includes 56 countries which gave complete timing of 
the targeting efforts towards at least one sector (we did not include in the sample sectors with 
incomplete timing information). It also includes 30 countries which were at some point 
engaged in targeting but did not provide complete timing information (for these countries we 
13 The number of 124 countries corresponds to the baseline specification in Table 2. 
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included only non-targeted sectors in the sample). Further 11 countries reporting no current or 
previous targeting efforts can be found in the sample. Finally, the sample includes 21 
countries which, to the best of our knowledge, do not have an IPA and 6 countries where we 
know for sure that no agency exists.14
Appendix 
Table 1
 The complete list of countries covered by the analysis 
and the number of observations capturing targeting efforts can be found in the 
. The overall sectoral breakdown of observations is listed in Appendix Table 2.  
As evident from Figure 2, sectors most frequently targeted by developing countries included 
ICT, electrical equipment and machinery. In developed countries, the sectors of choice were 
ICT, professional services, banking and finance. Wholesale trade was the least popular sector 
in both groups of countries.  
FDI data come from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). These data give the stocks 
of US FDI abroad.15 We use the first difference of the stocks to calculate flows. The BEA 
publishes information on 13 sectors until 1998 and 15 sectors from 1999.16
After these two changes, we match BEA sectors to the sector classification used in the Census 
to collect targeting information. See Appendix Table 3 for the concordance. We have a 
maximum of 15 sectors per country. The stock data are available from 1989-2004 (first 
differenced for 1990-2004). The summary statistics are presented in 
 We made two 
changes to the BEA data. We aggregated “Other manufacturing” and “Other industries” into 
one sector in the pre-1999 data, and “Machinery” and “Computer and electronic products” 
into one sector in the post-1998 data. The second change was to match sectors over time. Due 
to a break in the aggregation in 1998 in the BEA data, sector definitions are not exactly the 
same during the entire period. As our identification strategy is to follow sectors over time and 
test if post-targeting inflows are significantly higher than pre-targeting inflows (and inflows to 
non-targeted sectors), we would like to have long time periods before and after targeting. As 
the break in aggregation appeared around the middle of the period, we would typically have 
either very few years pre-targeting or very few years post-targeting had we not implemented 
the matching procedure.  
Table 1.  
The US is one of the top FDI source countries, so by focusing on US FDI we capture a large 
share of the world’s FDI stock. Figure 3, which compares the stock of US FDI to the stock of 
FDI from other OECD countries in 2000, demonstrates that US was the dominant source 
country in Latin America, East Asia and industrialized economies. Additional advantages of 
using the BEA data are their comparability across countries and access to figures on sales and 
                                               
14 Note that restricting the sample to the 56 countries which provided complete timing information 
would not change the conclusions of the study. This is also the case for the sample covering the 56 
countries mentioned and 30 countries which do not have an IPA. 
15 US direct investment abroad is defined as the ownership or control, directly or indirectly, by one US 
resident of 10 percent or more of the voting securities of an incorporated foreign business enterprise or 
the equivalent interest in an unincorporated foreign business enterprise. The data capture the 
cumulative value of parents' investments in their affiliates (source: 
http://www.bea.gov/bea/ai/0395iid/maintext.htm).  
Data points suppressed by the BEA for confidentiality reasons are treated as missing. Twelve 
percent of data points are suppressed. We check whether there is a correlation between sector targeting 
and the suppressed observations by estimating a linear probability model where the dependent variable 
is equal to one if the information on FDI in the sector-country-year cell has been suppressed, and zero 
if it is reported. The set of explanatory variables is the same as in our baseline specification (equation 
1). We find no statistically significant relationship between the likelihood of an observation being 
suppressed and sector targeting. 
Data points reported as values belonging to the range between -500,000 and 500,000 US dollars are 
treated as equal to 500,000 dollars. We interpolated missing information on stocks to increase the 
number of observations.  Excluding interpolated observations from the analysis would not change the 
conclusions of the study. 
16 From 1999, the BEA-data are classified under the 1997 North American Industry Classification 
System (NAICS).  Previously, data were classified under the Standard Industrial Classification System 
(SIC). 
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employment of US affiliates abroad. The sales and employment figures are available 1983-
2003. We use these figures in our robustness checks. 
In the analysis, we use the log of FDI inflows as our dependent variable. To deal with zeros 
we add one US dollar to all observations before taking logs. To deal with negative values we 
follow Blonigen (2004) and Eichengreen and Tong (2005) and set all negative values to 0.1 
US dollar before taking logs. 
In the extended specification, we include proxies capturing the difficulties associated with 
obtaining information on the host country and the extent of bureaucratic procedures in the 
host country. The first proxy is a dummy for host countries where English is an official 
language. The data come from CEPII.17 The second measure is the average cultural distance 
between the US and the host country. We use time-invariant scores on four cultural 
dimensions constructed by Geert Hofstede based on surveys conducted throughout several 
decades (starting out in the late 1960s) among workers of multinational firms, commercial 
airline pilots, students, civil service managers and other groups. The following dimensions are 
included: power distance, individualism, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance.18
In addition to using the average of the indicators, we will also use the index of power 
distance, which in our view is the most relevant one for companies undertaking FDI. This 
index captures how cultures differ in terms of the extent to which less powerful members of 
organizations accept unequal power distribution. A high value of the index correlates with a 
strong bureaucracy, hierarchical organizations and with low task orientation. Bypassing 
someone in the chain of command in order to get something done is less acceptable in 
countries with a high value of the index (Pakistan, Portugal, Venezuela) than in places with a 
low value (US, Ireland, Canada). In cultures such as the US, Netherlands, and Britain, the 
manager’s role tends to be more that of a facilitator/problem solver than an expert. Managers 
in these countries do not suffer a severe loss of credibility by virtue of not having precise 
answers to subordinate’s questions. The French, Japanese, Spanish, and Indonesians, on the 
other hand, are more likely to expect their managers to be experts.
 The figures 
are available for 56 countries. Each score ranges from 0 to 100. We take the absolute value of 
the difference between the US and the host country for each of the scores and find the average 
of the four figures. The variable enters the regressions in the log form.  
19
The final proxy used in the regression aims to capture the availability of information about the 
host country in the US. Following Daude and Fratzscher (2008), we use the value of exports 
of newspapers from the host country to the US, normalized by the population size of the host 
country. The information on trade in newspapers is time-varying and expressed in current US 
dollars. The data come from the UN’s COMTRADE database. We use trade flows for SITC 
codes 6411 “Newsprint” and 8922 “Newspapers, journals, and periodicals”.
 
20
We use four proxies to capture how burdensome bureaucratic procedures are in a host 
country. The first two proxies are the number of days required to obtain a construction permit 
in the host country and the number of day required to start a business in the host country. The 
figures come from the 2009 Doing Business Indicators compiled by the World Bank and are 
 
                                               
17 http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm, 
18 For a detailed description, see http://www.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede_dimensions.php. 
According to these measures, the US ranks high (91 compared to the world average of 43) in terms of 
individualism, which suggests it is a “society with a more individualistic attitude and relatively loose 
bonds with others.” The US ranks low in terms of uncertainty avoidance (46 versus the average of 64), 
which indicates a society that has fewer rules and does not attempt to control all outcomes and results 
and has a greater level of tolerance for a variety of ideas, thoughts, and beliefs. 
This data set has been cited by several economic studies (for instance, Shiller et al. 1992, Cozzi 
1998, Flanagan 1999). 
19 See http://www.orcworldwide.com/readroom/diversity_basics.php. 
20 We use the import figures as reported by the US. If the data are missing, we rely on exports reported 
by the host country. 
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based on the information collected in 2008.21
“Doing Business records all procedures required for a business in the construction industry to 
build a standardized warehouse. These procedures include submitting all relevant project-
specific documents (for example, building plans and site maps) to the authorities; obtaining 
all necessary clearances, licenses, permits and certificates; completing all required 
notifications; and receiving all necessary inspections. Doing Business also records procedures 
for obtaining all utility connections. Procedures necessary to register the property so that it 
can be used as collateral or transferred are also counted. The survey divides the process of 
building a warehouse into distinct procedures and calculates the time and cost of completing 
each procedure in practice under normal circumstances. Information is collected from experts 
in construction licensing, including architects, construction lawyers, construction firms, utility 
service providers and public officials who deal with building regulations, including approvals 
and inspections.”
 The definitions of the Doing Business 
Indicators are as follows. 
22
“Doing Business records all procedures that are officially required for an entrepreneur to start 
up and formally operate an industrial or commercial business. These include obtaining all 
necessary licenses and permits and completing any required notifications, verifications or 
inscriptions for the company and employees with relevant authorities.”
  
23
The next two measures capture government ineffectiveness and the extent of corruption. They 
were compiled by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi and are described in detail in their 2009 
publication. The measure of corruption captures “perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as 
well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.” The measure of government 
ineffectiveness captures “perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such 
policies.” Each measure is a composite index extracting information on governance from 35 
different sources. The authors assume that the available individual governance ratings reflect 
both some true but unobserved level of governance and sampling variations and perception 
errors. The unobserved “true” level of governance can be backed out statistically (assuming a 
linear unobserved component specification). The resulting estimates range from –2.5 to 2.5, 
with a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. The higher the estimate for each country, 
the better governed the country. For the purpose of our analysis, we multiply the index by -1 
so that a higher value corresponds to a higher level of corruption or government 
ineffectiveness. Both measures are available for 1996, 1998, 2000, and annually for 2002-
2008. We use the average value for the period covered by our sample.
 
24
 
  
                                               
21  The mismatch in the timing of this measure and our FDI data is regrettable, but unfortunately Doing 
Business Indicators are not available for the 1990s. The first version of the database was published in 
2004, but its country coverage was limited. Hence, we chose to use the latest available data in which 
the largest number of countries is included. Doing Business Indicators are widely used in the literature, 
see for instance Ciccone and Papaioannou (2007). 
22 For more information, see http://www.doingbusiness.org/MethodologySurveys/DealingLicenses.aspx 
23 For more information, see 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/MethodologySurveys/StartingBusiness.aspx 
24 The corruption index compiled by Kaufmann et al. (2009) was used, for instance, by Javorcik and 
Wei (2009). 
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4. Results 
4.1 Baseline analysis  
Taking advantage of information on sectors targeted by IPAs (if any), we use the difference-
in-differences approach and examine whether sectors targeted by IPA receive more FDI 
inflows in the post-targeting period relative to the pre-targeting period and non-targeted 
sectors. Our goal is not to check whether countries with IPAs engaged in sector targeting 
receive more FDI than countries that do not follow this approach. Rather, targeting is used as 
a convenient identification strategy that allows us to ask whether IPAs are successful at 
bringing the type of FDI they strive to attract.  
The estimated specification includes a set of controls. To take into account heterogeneity 
across sector-country combinations, we include sector-country fixed effects. Rather than 
including explicit country-level controls, we include in the specification country-year fixed 
effects. These control for all country-specific changes taking place over time. To the extent 
that changes in the host country policies, regulations and other factors affect FDI inflows to 
all sectors in the same way, country-year fixed effects will capture them. It is also possible 
that some global shocks affect the supply of FDI in a particular sector. To take this into 
account, we add sector-year fixed effects. To the extent global shocks affect flows of FDI into 
a particular sector in the same way across countries, they will be captured by sector-year fixed 
effects. 
The results, presented in the top panel of Table 2, suggest that investment promotion efforts 
are associated with higher FDI inflows. The coefficient on the post-targeting dummy is 
positive and statistically significant in 3 of 4 specifications. While we find no 
contemporaneous effect, all lagged specifications suggest a positive link between investment 
promotion and FDI inflows. This pattern is intuitive as it may take time for investment 
promotion efforts to bear fruit. The lag may be particularly pronounced when it comes to the 
effects of marketing campaigns.25
In the other panels of the table, we present two robustness checks. First, we show that our 
results are robust to controlling for region-sector-year fixed effects. Geographic regions are 
defined based on the World Bank classification and include Latin American and the 
Caribbean, East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, South 
Asia, Middle East and North Africa, and developed countries. Thus if, for instance, South 
Asia becomes a more attractive destination for ICT investment due to an increase in skilled 
labor availability, these fixed effects will take it into account. Second, we show that our 
results are robust to controlling for country-sector-specific time trends. So if, for example, 
India becomes a more attractive destination for ICT investment due to an increasing 
availability in computer programmers, this trend will be taken into account. 
  
 
4.2 What about reverse causality? 
To investigate the possibility that our results are driven by reverse causality–that is 
investment inflows determine subsequent targeting done by host countries rather the other 
way around–we conduct a strict exogeneity test. As suggested by Wooldridge (2002, p. 285), 
we estimate a specification with a contemporaneous effect of targeting as well as its lead and 
lag. We do so for the full sample as well as for the subsamples of developing and developed 
countries. We find a positive and significant effect of lagged targeting in the full sample and 
the subsample of developing countries (see Table 3). No significant effect is detected for 
                                               
25 When the contemporaneous and the lagged effects enter the same specification, only the latter is 
statistically significant. A more detailed investigation of the timing of the effects suggests that the 
effect of targeting increases over time. This gradual increase is very pronounced in the developing 
country subsample. 
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developed economies. More importantly, we find that leads of targeting variables are negative 
and insignificant in all three models. Moreover, in the first two samples we can reject the 
hypothesis that the effect of the lead value is the same as the combined effect of the current 
and past targeting. These estimation results give us confidence that our analysis does not 
suffer from reverse causality problems. 
We also estimate a probit regression modeling the determinants of sector targeting. The 
dependent variable is equal to one if country c begins targeting industry i at time t, and zero if 
the industry is not targeted at time t.26 The purpose of the exercise is to find out whether past 
FDI inflows or FDI stocks in industry i in country c (lagged one, two or three periods) can 
predict future targeting of the industry. The model also includes controls for country 
characteristics, such as log of GDP per capita, log of population size, GDP growth, inflation, 
restrictions on civil liberties as well as country and year fixed effects.27
As another robustness check, we remove from the sample observations for targeted sectors in 
countries where the investment promotion agencies reported in the Census that the choice of 
priority sectors was based on the earlier success in attracting inflows to those sectors or the 
lack thereof. As can be seen in Appendix Table 5, removing these countries leads to a 
stronger rather than weaker effect of the investment promotion efforts.  
 We do not find a 
statistically significant coefficient on the FDI variable in any of the six specifications (see 
Appendix Table 4).  
In sum, all of the above results suggest that reverse causality is not an issue in our analysis. 
 
4.3 Is the effectiveness of IPAs influenced by information asymmetries? 
The theoretical and empirical literature, reviewed in the introduction, suggests that 
information asymmetries constitute a significant obstacle to capital flows across international 
borders.28 One of the core functions of investment promotion is to alleviate the problems 
associated with the lack of information. If investment promotion is an effective channel of 
alleviating information asymmetries, it should be more effective in countries where 
information is harder to obtain.29
To examine this question in more detail, we first ask whether the effects of targeting are more 
pronounced in countries where English is not an official language. As evident from Table 4, 
this is indeed the case. In both specifications, the coefficient on sector targeting is positive 
and statistically significant, but its interaction with the dummy for English being an official 
 
                                               
26 Thus observations for targeted sectors in years other than the first year of targeting are not included 
in the sample. 
27 The GDP and population variables are used as proxies for the market size. They come from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). The inflation rate, provided by the IMF 
International Financial Statistics, is a proxy for macroeconomic stability. As measures of political 
institutions and business climate we use a time-varying index of civil liberties from Freedom House. It 
ranges from 1 denoting the freest countries to 7 denoting the least free countries.  
28 Gordon and Bovenberg (1996, p. 1059) argue that “Investors, by living and working in a particular 
country, know much more about the economic prospects of that country than they do about those in 
other countries. . . . Foreigners' lack of knowledge can result also in a less efficient use of real 
resources, due for example to their poorer ability . . . to deal with idiosyncratic aspects of the domestic 
contract law . . . and local customs governing labor relations.”  
29 There is a long standing debate in the literature on whether marketing plays an informative or a 
persuasive role. While this question has not been resolved, there is ample evidence suggesting that 
marketing efforts pay off. For instance, using data from a field experiment in South Africa Bertrand et 
al. (2010) find that advertising content affects demand for loans. They also find that showing a female 
photo increases demand by about as much as a 200-basis point reduction in the interest rate.  
In our study, we do not take a stand on whether IPAs play an informative or persuasive role (they 
probably do both), we are simply interested in exploring whether their efforts are effective. 
 14 
language is negative and significant.30 This suggests that investment promotion efforts are 
more effective in countries where English is not widely spoken, which is consistent with our 
belief that it is easier to obtain information and learn how to do business in these economies. 
We cannot reject the hypothesis that investment promotion has no effect in countries where 
English is an official language.31
In the remainder of Table 4, we use the other proxies for information asymmetries. To 
facilitate the comparison of results across various specifications, we subtract from each proxy 
its mean calculated over the relevant sample.
 
32 Thus, for instance in column 3 the interaction 
term for the country with the average cultural distance vis a vis the US will take on the value 
of zero. It will take on a positive value for countries more culturally different than the average 
and a negative value for countries less culturally different than the average.33
The results, presented in columns 3 through 6, confirm that the effectiveness of investment 
promotion depends on the cultural distance between the US and the host country. The results 
for the overall distance and the difference in perceptions of hierarchy (power distance) are 
quite similar. The interaction term between the dummy for targeted sectors and the cultural 
distance is positive and significant in all cases. The Post targeting dummy itself bears a 
positive sign (though it is not statistically significant in one specification). These results 
suggest that investment promotion plays a greater role in attracting FDI to culturally distant 
countries. 
 
Finally, we turn to the proxy capturing the availability of information about the host country 
in the US (exports of newspapers). In both specifications, we find that lower availability of 
newspapers is associated with greater effectiveness of investment promotion, though only the 
contemporaneous effect is statistically significant.  
In sum, we conclude that the evidence presented so far suggests that the positive relationship 
between investment promotion and FDI inflows works (at least to some extent) through IPAs 
alleviating information asymmetries. 
 
4.4 Are IPAs more effective in countries with more burdensome red 
tape? 
As mentioned earlier, one of the functions of an IPA is to assist committed investors with 
obtaining investment permits, licenses, business registration, work permits for expatriate staff 
and other bureaucratic procedures. Well-functioning IPAs can to some extent compensate for 
deficiencies of bureaucracies in their countries. If this is indeed one of the channels through 
which investment promotion works, we would expect to see that investment promotion efforts 
are more effective in countries with less efficient bureaucracies and more burdensome red 
tape. 
Our results, presented in the first four columns of Table 5, are consistent with this view. We 
find that targeted sectors receive on average more FDI and that this effect is larger in 
                                               
30 Note that our specification does not include the English variable by itself as the model contains 
country-year fixed effects. 
31 Note that we used the DFITS statistics of Welsch and Kuh (1977) to drop influential observations 
from the regressions presented in the first two columns of Table 4. We used the cutoff of 2√(k/N) 
suggested by Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980).  
32 For instance, the full data set is the relevant sample in Table 4, while in Table 8 developing countries 
are the relevant sample. 
33 Although the information on cultural distance is not available for all countries, we avoid losing 
observations for country-sectors which are not engaged in targeting because in those cases Post 
targeting*Information asymmetry equals 0 due to Post targeting being equal to 0, and it is not 
necessary to have non-missing data for cultural distance. 
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countries with less effective governments and a higher corruption level.34 In all specifications, 
the estimated coefficients are statistically significant. In the next four columns, we show that 
investment promotion plays a greater role in countries where it takes longer to start a business 
and to obtain a construction permit.35
Summing up, our data provide evidence consistent with IPAs stimulating inflows of FDI by 
alleviating the burden of the red tape. 
 The targeting dummy is positive and significant in all 
specifications and the interaction term is positive and statistically significant in 3 of 4 cases. 
 
4.5 What matters more: information provision or help with 
bureaucratic procedures? 
In Table 6, we present specifications where proxies for information asymmetries and 
transaction costs are included in the same specification. In all regressions, the targeting effect 
is positive and statistically significant and the interaction terms have the expected signs. Of 
the 16 interaction terms in 8 specifications, 10 are statistically significant. 4 of these terms 
pertain to information asymmetries and 6 to transaction costs.  
Thus we conclude that while investment promotion appears to work both through information 
provision and assistance with red tape, the preponderance of evidence suggests that the latter 
channel is more important. 
The result that investment promotion is more effective in the presence of information 
asymmetries or more burdensome bureaucratic procedures is an interesting finding in its own 
right. Moreover, testing a more nuanced prediction and showing that investment promotion 
works better where we would expect it to do so suggests that we are indeed capturing the 
effects of IPA efforts rather than some other factors. 
 
4.6 Is there a difference between developed and developing countries? 
Next we investigate whether the effects of investment promotion differ between developed 
and developing countries.36
As evident from Table 7, we find no evidence of investment promotion being effective in 
industrialized economies. The estimated coefficient is negative in all specification and in two 
of them appears to be insignificant. Note that this result is not driven by outliers. 
 As information on business conditions is less readily available on 
developing countries and since such economies tend to have more burdensome regulations, 
we expect to find that investment promotion is more effective in a developing country setting.  
What is more interesting from the perspective of our study is that investment promotion 
appears to lead to higher FDI inflows in emerging markets. The coefficient on the post-
targeting dummy is positive and statistically significant in all specification in the developing 
country subsample. As time may be needed for the effects of investment promotion to become 
visible, it is not surprising the coefficients on lagged dummies increase with the length of the 
lag. 
In the next table (Table 8), we show that even within the subsample of developing countries 
investment promotion is more effective in economies with worse performing governments, 
countries where it takes longer to obtain a construction permit and places more culturally 
different from the US. An interaction between the targeting dummy and exports of 
                                               
34 Recall that by construction both of these proxies have a mean zero. 
35 Recall that to facilitate comparisons, we subtract from the measure of bureaucratic burden the 
average value for the sample. 
36 The definition of developing countries is based on the World Bank classification. For a list of 
developing countries, see Appendix Table 1. 
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newspapers does not produce a statistically significant coefficient. These results confirm our 
earlier conclusions about information provision and lessening of bureaucratic burden being 
two channels through which investment promotion stimulates inflows of FDI. 
We also perform additional checks testing the robustness of the relationship between 
investment promotion and FDI inflows in developing countries, which we do not report to 
save space. First, one may be concerned that our findings could be driven by simultaneous 
opening to FDI and targeting of services industries where entry of foreign investors was 
restricted in the past. To eliminate this possibility, we exclude from the sample services 
sectors and utilities and show that this change does not affect our findings. Second, as 
agglomeration effects may be important in attracting FDI (see Wheeler and Mody 1992, 
Bobonis and Shatz 2007), we include the lagged FDI stock in the sector. Note that in this way 
we control for sector-specific agglomeration effects. General agglomeration effects associated 
with FDI are already captured by country-year fixed effects. Including lagged FDI in our 
model does not affect our results with respect to investment promotion. Third, the choice of 
the control group is an important consideration. In our analysis, we have compared targeted 
sectors before and after targeting with sectors that were not targeted. A potential concern is 
that inclusion of a large number of low performing (in terms of FDI inflows) sectors could 
amplify the effect of targeting and thus exaggerate its effect. To evaluate this concern we 
estimate the effect of targeting on the subsample of 56 countries that targeted at least one 
sector during the period covered by our analysis (for the list see Appendix Table 1). The 
estimated coefficients on the targeting variable are positive and significant at the 1 or 5 
percent level. 
An aspect of investment promotion that typically receives high levels of attention from both 
policy makers and academics is investment incentives. Thus we would like to shed light on 
whether our findings on IPA effectiveness are driven mostly by information provision or 
lessening the red tape costs or whether they could be capturing existing financial and fiscal 
incentives. 
In the Census, we collected time-varying information on different types of investment 
incentives: financial incentives, tax holidays, reduced tax rates and subsidized infrastructure 
or services. Unfortunately, this information is available only at the country (and not country-
sector) level. However, the Census questionnaire did ask whether targeted sectors were 
eligible for more incentives than other industries and when such policy was in effect. While 
we recognize that this information is imperfect, we nevertheless find it interesting to check 
whether the existence of incentives has an effect beyond sector targeting.  
In additional regressions, not reported to save space, we augment the specification from 
column 4 in Table 7 by adding an interaction between the post-targeting dummy and the 
special incentives dummy. The latter dummy takes on the value of 1 if the agency indicated 
that the investors in targeted sectors had been eligible at some point in time for more 
incentives than those entering non-targeted sectors, and zero otherwise. While we find that 
priority sectors receive more FDI, there is no indication that special incentives boost inflows 
to targeted sectors. Next, we include a triple interaction between the post-targeting dummy, 
the special incentives dummy and a dummy for a country offering any type of general 
incentives at any point in time. Again while our basic result holds, the interaction term is not 
statistically significant. Then we take into account the timing of special incentives, but doing 
so does not affect our findings. Finally, we interact the post-targeting dummy with the general 
incentives dummy. The interaction term is not statistically significant, but the post-targeting 
dummy is both positive and significant. In sum, we find no evidence of investment incentives 
leading to additional FDI inflows, which supports our earlier conclusion of information 
provision being the key channel through which investment promotion works. 
In the final exercise, we search for evidence of FDI diversion due to IPA efforts in competing 
host countries. Evidence confirming the existence of diversion would be suggestive of 
investment incentives playing a role in IPA efforts. To take into account competition, we 
 17 
include in the regression the number of countries in the same geographic region targeting FDI 
inflows in the same sector.37 This sum is weighted either by the GDP or the population size of 
the relevant countries. The variable enters the regression in the log form.38
In sum, our results suggest that investment promotion efforts are associated with higher FDI 
inflows to targeted sectors in emerging markets. Lessening of the red tape costs and 
information asymmetries appear to be the key channels through which investment promotion 
works.  
 The results, 
presented in Table 9, show no evidence of FDI diversion due to competition from other 
countries. While the coefficients on sector targeting are positive and statistically significant, 
the coefficients on the competition measure never reach the conventional significance levels. 
We also repeated this exercise focusing on competition from countries in the same income 
group (low income, lower middle income, upper middle income) rather than in the same 
geographic region. The results, not reported to save space, are similar to those found in Table 
9.  
 
4.7 Comparing benefits and costs of investment promotion 
Our analysis allows us to conduct a back-of-the-envelope cost-benefit calculation. On the 
benefit side, we find that in the post-targeting period, priority sectors in developing countries 
tend to receive 155% higher FDI inflows (column 4 in   
relative to non-targeted sectors. This effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. While 
the magnitude of the effect may seem large, it is not implausible. Many sectors experience 
zero and close to zero inflows. If we consider only positive flows of US FDI, the median 
value in our developing country subsample is 11 million dollars. Thus, the estimated 155% 
percent increase would mean an additional annual inflow of 17 million dollars for the median 
sector-country observation.  
A quick look at the amounts multinational corporations actually invest in emerging markets 
reveals that FDI inflows of this magnitude are not uncommon. For example, hosting one of 
the world’s most successful investment promotion agencies (according to Sachs 2006), 
Malaysia attracted about 17.5 billion dollars of FDI in 2007, distributed across 949 projects 
and representing a potential of 98,000 jobs.39 CzechInvest reports investment projects in 
which the investors have been in contact with the agency. One example is the US based 
company IRCR Manufacturing s.r.o. that invested 42 million dollars in the automotive 
industry in 2001, another is the US based Kimberly-Clark s.r.o. investing 54 million dollars in 
2003 and a third is the US-based ExxonMobil Business Support Center Czechia s.r.o., 
investing 34 million dollars in the sector of financial and accounting operations in 2003. The 
average size of the 91 US sourced investment projects taking place over the 1993-2007 period 
in the Czech Republic was 16 million dollars and 211 jobs.40
On the cost side, we rely on the 2004 budget figures obtained from the Census and find that 
an average IPA spent 90,000 per sector targeted. Combining the benefit and the cost side, we 
conclude a dollar spent on investment promotion leads to 189 dollars of FDI inflows. In other 
 
                                               
37 The definition of geographic regions is based on the World Bank classification and includes: East 
Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, Middle East and North 
Africa, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa.  
38 One may wonder whether this analysis does not call for the inclusion of terms capturing spatial 
interdependence between host countries. However, recent analysis by Blonigen et al. (2007) suggests 
that the estimated relationships of traditional determinants of FDI are surprisingly robust to the 
inclusion of measures of spatial interdependence and, after controlling for country-specific dummy 
variables, estimated effects of spatial terms are often insignificant. 
39 http://www.mida.gov.my/ 
40 http://www.czechinvest.org/en/why-invest-in-the-czech-republic  
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words, bringing a dollar of FDI inflows costs half a cent in investment promotion 
expenditures.  
In an alternative exercise, we focus on the cost of creating a new job in a foreign affiliate. 
This is also a relevant metric as most policy makers care about creating employment and 
recent research shows that foreign affiliates tend to pay higher wages than domestic firms to 
workers with similar characteristics. In Appendix Table 6, we repeat our exercise but change 
the dependent variable to employment and sales of US affiliates abroad. These data also come 
from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis but they are more limited in their coverage. We 
confirm our earlier conclusions. Investment promotion efforts lead to higher FDI inflows in 
developing countries. In all specifications, we find positive and statistically significant (at the 
five or one percent level) coefficients. Based on the specification from column 5, we find that 
targeted sectors see a 68 percent increase in employment relative to non-targeted sectors. This 
translates into additional 1,159 jobs per sector. Using the above figures on costs of targeting 
would suggest an investment promotion spending of 78 dollars per job created. This figure 
suggests that investment promotion is an inexpensive policy. It seems even more so, if we 
keep in mind that the value of productivity spillovers from FDI estimated by Haskel et al. 
(2007) was equal to 4,300 dollars (in 2000 prices) per job created by foreign affiliates.41
How does investment promotion compare to other policies available to host countries? An 
alternative way to draw in FDI would be to offer foreign investors tax reductions. In a meta-
analysis of the empirical literature, Mooij and Everdeen (2003) find that the semi-elasticity of 
FDI with respect to the host country tax rate is -3.3. Thus a tax reduction of 10 percentage 
points would lead to an increase in FDI of 39 percent.
 
42 If the tax reduction applied only to 
new FDI investment projects, lasted 5 years and the average return on assets (ROA) were 
equal to 20 percent, the cost in terms of lost corporate tax revenue over the 5 year period 
would be Δtax*5 years*ROA*FDI =0.2*5*0.2*FDI = 0.2FDI.  Thus the benefit-cost ratio 
would equal to 0.39/0.2 or about 10 dollars of additional FDI per a dollar of foregone tax 
revenue.43
Alternatively, a government could attempt to stimulate employment growth by subsidizing 
entrepreneurs who create jobs. Scott A. Shane provides a rough calculation of the costs of 
such policy in the US.
 
44
The cost-benefit ratio of investment promotion compares favorably to those of alternative 
policies available to governments. We do caution the readers, however, that our cost-benefit 
calculations of investment promotion efforts are very rough and should be taken with a grain 
of salt. On the one hand, they capture only the effect of targeting on flows of US FDI. To the 
extent that investment promotion has a similar effect on investors from other economies, our 
analysis will underestimate the benefits of investment promotion activities. On the other hand, 
there may exist other factors which contribute to the success of investment promotion and 
whose costs we are not taking into account (for instance, priority sectors may be awarded 
 A representative survey of new business start-up efforts in the US 
indicates that the median entrepreneur needs 15,000 dollars to pursue a new business idea and 
can provide 6,000 dollars. Therefore, 9,000 dollars in additional financing would be needed to 
overcome this capital gap and allow an entrepreneur to start a business. Data from the Small 
Business Administration reveal that the average number of employees in a new employer firm 
is 5.6. Hence, the average cost per a new employee (not taking into account business failures) 
would be about 2,678 dollars. 
                                               
41 Admittedly, these estimates pertain to the UK and one can question whether spillovers in developing 
countries are similar to those found in industrialized countries. 
42  exp(-3.3(Δtax))=exp(-3.3(-0.1))=1.39. 
43  A larger reduction in the tax rate would increase the amount of foregone tax revenue per dollar of 
additional FDI. If the tax reduction were offered to all foreign investors, rather than just new FDI 
projects, the cost of policy would increase substantially. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for 
suggesting this exercise. 
44 http://boss.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/06/how-much-does-it-cost-to-create-a-job-by-encouraging-
entrepreneurship/ 
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access to accelerated bureaucratic procedures). Finally, one needs to stress that our analysis 
captures the average, not the marginal, effect. Thus we are not suggesting that a large increase 
in investment promotion spending on the part of economies already engaged in such practice 
will lead to spectacular increases in FDI inflows. Rather, we interpret our results as 
suggesting that countries not engaged in investment promotion may be benefit from such 
activities. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Given that information asymmetries between host countries and potential foreign investors 
and the burden of the red tape in host countries act as barrier to investment flows across 
international borders, an important policy question is: what can aspiring FDI destinations do 
to reduce such barriers?  
The newly collected and very detailed data on sector-specific investment promotion efforts in 
124 countries allow us to examine this question. We do so by testing whether sectors 
explicitly targeted by investment promotion agencies in their efforts to attract FDI receive 
more investment in the post-targeting period, relative to the pre-targeting period and non-
targeted sectors.  
The results of our analysis are consistent with investment promotion decreasing information 
asymmetries, lessening the burden of bureaucratic procedures and leading to higher FDI flows 
to developing countries. No such link is found for industrialized economies. Our findings 
suggest that investment promotion can be a potent tool for emerging markets wishing to 
attract FDI inflows.  
The past several years have witnessed a resurgence of interest in industrial policies on the part 
of developing country governments. In contrast to most industrial policies whose benefits are 
often disputed, our results suggest that investment promotion is an inexpensive and effective 
option available to emerging country governments wishing to stimulate economic 
development. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics  
 
 
  No. of obs. Mean Std. dev. 
Country-sector-specific variables 
FDI inflow (million current US dollars) 17196 49.20 791.00 
Post targeting  17196 0.10 0.30 
 
Country-specific variables 
English as official language 123 0.26 0.44 
Cultural distance  49 29.59 11.96 
Power distance  49 22.78 15.27 
Construction permits  113 228.46 188.88 
Starting a business 114 41.30 70.84 
Government ineffectiveness 122 0.06 1.02 
Corruption 122 0.03 1.04 
Exports of newspapers/population of 
exporter (US dollars/person) 1628 2.52 24.73 
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Table 2: Baseline specification 
 
  All All All All 
Post targeting 0.308    
 (0.341)    
L. Post targeting  0.770**   
  (0.362)   
L2. Post targeting   1.033**  
   (0.406)  
L3. Post targeting    0.968** 
    (0.457) 
No. of observations 17196 17193 16610 16009 
No. of country-sector groups 1570 1570 1570 1568 
Within R-squared 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 
Robustness check: Controlling for region-sector-year fixed effects 
Post targeting 0.362    
 (0.337)    
L. Post targeting  0.764**   
  (0.358)   
L2. Post targeting   0.952**  
   (0.403)  
L3. Post targeting    0.801* 
    (0.455) 
No. of observations 17196 17193 16610 16009 
Within R-squared 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.14 
Robustness check: Controlling for country-sector-specific time trends 
Post targeting 0.125    
 [0.374]    
L. Post targeting  0.689*   
  [0.395]   
L2. Post targeting   1.048**  
   [0.444]  
L3. Post targeting    1.057** 
    [0.498] 
No. of observations 17196 17193 16610 16009 
Within R-squared 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.56 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 
10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of inflow of US foreign direct 
investment into industry i in country c at time t. Post targeting is equal to one if industry i was 
targeted by country c at time t, and zero otherwise. LX means lagged X periods. All models in 
the top panel include country-year, sector-year and country-sector fixed effects. All models in 
the middle panel include country-year, region-sector-year and country-sector fixed effects. 
Geographic regions are defined based on the World Bank classification. All models in the 
bottom panel include country-year and sector-year fixed effects as well country-sector time 
trends 
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Table 3: Strict exogeneity test.   
 
 All Developing Developed 
Post targeting 0.095 0.418 -1.248 
 (0.654) (0.628) (1.972) 
L. Post targeting 1.097* 0.962* 1.045 
 (0.568) (0.542) (1.776) 
    
Lead    
F. Post targeting -0.787 -0.240 -2.273 
 (0.507) (0.492) (1.483) 
    
Constant 3.188 6.074 5.110** 
 (2.624) (4.861) (2.457) 
No. of observations 15775 11927 3848 
Country-sectors 1554 1188 366 
R-sq within 0.17 0.19 0.19 
Test Post targeting + 
L. Post targeting t=0 (p-value) 0.04 0.01 0.91 
 
Test Post targeting + 
L. Post targeting t= F. Post 
targeting (p-value) 
0.04 0.09 0.48 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance 
at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of inflow 
of US foreign direct investment into industry i in country c at time t. Post targeting 
is equal to one if industry i was targeted by country c at time t, and zero otherwise. 
L denotes the first lag and F denotes a one period lead. All models include 
country-year, sector-year and country-sector fixed effects. 
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Table 4: Proxies for information asymmetries 
 
  All All All All All All All All 
 English Cultural distance Power distance Exports of newspapers to USA/population 
Post targeting 0.805***  0.912  1.457**  0.438  
 (0.252)  (0.574)  (0.651)  (0.344)  
Post targeting*Information 
asymmetry 
-1.261**  2.355***  1.701***  -0.017*  
(0.504)  (0.849)  (0.641)  (0.009)  
L. Post targeting  0.716***  1.511**  2.025***  0.810** 
  (0.277)  (0.616)  (0.711)  (0.365) 
L. Post targeting* Information 
asymmetry 
 -0.952*  1.607*  1.361**  -0.005 
 (0.550)  (0.901)  (0.681)  (0.009) 
No. of observations 15312 14539 14871 14868 14871 14868 17170 17165 
No. of country-sector groups 1529 1528 1358 1358 1358 1358 1570 1570 
Within R-squared 0.45 0.45 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.18 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is 
the log of inflow of US foreign direct investment into industry i in country c at time t. Post targeting is equal to one if industry i was targeted by 
country c at time t, and zero otherwise. LX means lagged X periods. All models include country-year, sector-year and country-sector fixed effects. 
All proxies for information asymmetry (with the exception of English) have been demeaned. 
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Table 5: Proxies for transaction costs  
 
 All All All All All All All All 
 Government ineffectiveness Corruption 
Starting a business 
(no. of days) 
Construction permits 
(no. of days) 
Post targeting 0.633*  0.621*  1.218***  0.933**  
 (0.360)  (0.358)  (0.442)  (0.405)  
Post targeting*Transaction 
costs 
1.159***  1.080***  1.198***  1.589**  
(0.359)  (0.327)  (0.405)  (0.633)  
L. Post targeting  1.003***  0.993***  1.271***  1.201*** 
  (0.383)  (0.380)  (0.464)  (0.419) 
L. Post targeting* Transaction 
costs 
 0.688*  0.648*  0.664  1.213* 
 (0.391)  (0.358)  (0.432)  (0.673) 
No. of observations 17166 17163 17166 17163 17091 17088 17091 17088 
No. of country-sector groups 1568 1568 1568 1568 1561 1561 1561 1561 
Within R-squared 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.18 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is 
the log of inflow of US foreign direct investment into industry i in country c at time t. Post targeting is equal to one if industry i was targeted by 
country c at time t, and zero otherwise. LX means lagged X periods. All models include country-year, sector-year and country-sector fixed effects. 
All proxies for transaction costs have been demeaned or have a mean of zero by construction. 
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Table 6: Proxies for information asymmetry and transaction costs  
 
  All All All All All All All All 
Proxies for information 
asymmetry 
Exports of newspapers to 
the US/population English Cultural distance Power distance 
Proxies for transaction costs Government ineffectiveness Corruption 
Construction permits 
(no. of days) 
Starting a business 
(no. of days) 
Post targeting 0.680*  1.107***  1.380*  2.800***  
 (0.360)  (0.397)  (0.775)  (0.755)  
Post targeting*Information 
asymmetry 
-0.009  -2.288***  1.974**  0.938  
(0.009)  (0.815)  (0.949)  (0.677)  
Post targeting 1.020***  0.994***  1.170  2.078***  
* Transaction costs (0.379)  (0.329)  (1.302)  (0.592)  
  1.014***  1.306***  1.439*  2.635*** 
L. Post targeting  (0.383)  (0.421)  (0.794)  (0.795) 
L. Post targeting* Information 
asymmetry 
 -0.000  -1.456*  1.670*  0.924 
 (0.009)  (0.872)  (1.000)  (0.727) 
L. Post targeting* Transaction 
costs 
 0.698*  0.605*  -0.204  1.067* 
 (0.416)  (0.360)  (1.412)  (0.621) 
No. of observations 17140 17135 16995 16992 14871 14868 14871 14868 
No. of country-sector groups 1568 1568 1553 1553 1358 1358 1358 1358 
Within R-squared 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is 
the log of inflow of US foreign direct investment into industry i in country c at time t. Post targeting is equal to one if industry i was targeted by 
country c at time t, and zero otherwise. LX means lagged X periods. All models include country-year, sector-year and country-sector fixed effects. 
All proxies for information asymmetry (with the exception of English) and transaction costs have been demeaned or have a mean of zero by 
construction. 
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Table 7: Developed versus developing countries  
 
  Developed Developed Developed  Developing Developing Developing 
Post targeting -1.913*    0.935***   
 (0.998)    (0.330)   
L. Post targeting  -0.892    1.159***  
  (1.106)    (0.346)  
L2. Post targeting   -0.525    1.377*** 
   (1.291)    (0.387) 
           
No. of observations 4184 4181 4088  13012 13012 12522 
No. of country-sector groups 367 367 367  1203 1203 1203 
Within R-squared 0.19 0.19 0.19  0.19 0.19 0.19 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The 
dependent variable is the log of inflow of US foreign direct investment into industry i in country c at time t. Post targeting is equal to 
one if industry i was targeted by country c at time t, and zero otherwise. LX means lagged X periods. All models include country-
year, sector-year and country-sector fixed effects. 
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Table 8: Developing countries and information asymmetries 
 
  Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing 
 Government ineffectiveness 
Construction permits 
(no. of days) Power distance 
Exports of newspapers to 
the US/population 
Post targeting 1.243***  1.490***  3.464***  0.942***  
 (0.375)  (0.395)  (0.774)  (0.330)  
Post targeting*Information 
asymmetry 
0.956*  1.720**  2.295**  2.572  
(0.509)  (0.669)  (0.932)  (1.823)  
L. Post targeting  1.380***  1.634***  3.784***  1.178*** 
  (0.403)  (0.405)  (0.866)  (0.347) 
L. Post targeting* Information 
asymmetry 
 0.471  1.546**  2.250**  2.066 
 (0.533)  (0.683)  (0.994)  (2.270) 
No. of observations 12982 12982 13012 13012 10832 10832 13012 13012 
No. of country-sector groups 1201 1201 1203 1203 1004 1004 1203 1203 
Within R-squared 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.19 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is 
the log of inflow of US foreign direct investment into industry i in country c at time t. Post targeting is equal to one if industry i was targeted by 
country c at time t, and zero otherwise. LX means lagged X periods. All models include country-year, sector-year and country-sector fixed effects. 
All proxies for information asymmetry and transaction costs have been demeaned or have a mean of zero by construction. 
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Table 9: Competition from other countries in the same geographic region 
 
  Developing Developing Developing  Developing Developing Developing  
 Targeting by competitors (GDP weighted) Targeting by competitors (population weighted) 
Post targeting 0.971***    0.949***    
 (0.338)    (0.334)    
Competition 0.158    0.132    
 (0.158)    (0.214)    
L. Post targeting  1.140***    1.129***   
  (0.355)    (0.350)   
L. Competition  -0.164    -0.247   
  (0.150)    (0.214)   
L2. Post targeting   1.341***    1.351***  
   (0.396)    (0.391)  
L2. Competition   -0.143    -0.193  
   (0.157)    (0.229)  
               
No. of observations 12479 12463 11981  12847 12834 12345  
No. of country-sector groups 1174 1174 1173  1187 1187 1174  
Within R-squared 0.19 0.19 0.19  0.19 0.19 0.19  
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is 
the log of inflow of US foreign direct investment into industry i in country c at time t. Post targeting is equal to one if industry i was targeted by 
country c at time t, and zero otherwise. LX means lagged X periods. All models include country-year, sector-year and country-sector fixed effects. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Number of IPAs in existence 
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Figure 2: Frequency of targeting by sector 
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Figure 3: US FDI stock versus FDI stock from other OECD countries in year 2000 
 
Note: Figure based on bilateral OECD data, FDI stocks in million USD, 
year 2000. Regional breakdown corresponds to the World Bank 
classification of developing countries: Latin American and the Caribbean 
(LAC), East Asia and the Pacific (EAP), Europe and Central Asia (ECA), 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), South Asia (SA) and Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA). High income countries do not include the US. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix Table 1: Countries included in the analysis 
 Survey respondents                Existence of IPA could not be confirmed   No IPA exists  
No   Targeted Total No    Targeted Total No    Targeted Total No    Total No    Total 
1 Albania 20 129  34 Guatemala 58 165  67 Pakistan 0 60  98 Andorra* 70  119 Congo, Rep. 188 
2 Algeria 0 175  35 Guinea 97 161  68 Palau 0 177  99 Brunei* 180  120 Kuwait* 176 
3 Argentina 0 180  36 Guyana 0 65  69 Panama 4 49  100 Cameroon 183  121 Liechtenstein* 171 
4 Armenia 25 70  37 Hungary 24 98  70 Paraguay 0 163  101 Central African Rep 70  122 Norway* 175 
5 Aruba* 30 161  38 Iceland* 40 170  71 Peru 26 147  102 Chad 189  123 Somalia 189 
6 Australia* 172 187  39 Iran, Islamic Rep. 0 187  72 Poland 0 37  103 Cuba 174  124 St. Kitts and Nevis 189 
7 Bangladesh 0 60  40 Ireland* 0 76  73 Portugal* 121 166  104 Djibouti 179      
8 Belize 0 160  41 Israel* 0 104  74 Romania 0 163  105 Equatorial Guinea 153      
9 Bhutan 0 29  42 Italy* 0 79  75 Samoa 30 189  106 Ethiopia 188      
10 Bosnia and Herzegovina 55 128  43 Jamaica 14 78  76 Saudi Arabia* 0 95  107 Eritrea 93      
11 Botswana 20 170  44 Japan* 0 188  77 Senegal 65 165  108 Gabon 178      
12 Brazil 0 155  45 Jordan 129 162  78 Serbia and Montenegro 43 106  109 Haiti 173      
13 Bulgaria 59 104  46 Kazakhstan 64 123  79 Singapore* 0 179  110 Iraq 14      
14 Cambodia 58 81  47 Kenya 0 141  80 Slovak Republic 0 107  111 Kyrgyz Republic 70      
15 Canada* 84 178  48 Korea, Rep. 0 188  81 Slovenia 110 150  112 Libya 177      
16 Chile 98 151  49 Lao PDR 0 59  82 Solomon Islands 0 13  113 Mali 174      
17 China 0 177  50 Latvia 28 88  83 South Africa 115 140  114 Sudan 189      
18 Colombia 0 79  51 Lebanon 103 176  84 St. Vincent and the G 50 189  115 Suriname 162      
19 Congo, Dem. Rep. 50 180  52 Lesotho 0 85  85 Sweden* 119 153  116 Togo 189      
20 Costa Rica 96 176  53 Lithuania 85 110  86 Switzerland* 0 173  117 Turkmenistan 129      
21 Cyprus* 40 173  54 Macedonia, FYR 0 60  87 Taiwan* 0 79  118 Uzbekistan 123      
22 Czech Republic 53 108  55 Madagascar 180 180  88 Thailand 0 50           
23 Côte d'Ivoire 133 174  56 Malta* 0 66  89 Tunisia 68 161           
24 Denmark* 0 131  57 Mauritania 100 184  90 Turkey 0 166           
25 Ecuador 43 163  58 Mauritius 99 178  91 Uganda 150 180           
26 Egypt, Arab Rep. 0 137  59 Mexico 18 141  92 United Kingdom* 0 189           
27 El Salvador 120 163  60 Moldova 0 35  93 Uruguay 0 169           
28 Fiji 41 156  61 Mozambique 35 114  94 Vanuatu 108 178           
29 Finland* 46 164  62 Netherlands* 25 107  95 Venezuela, RB 64 151           
30 France* 40 92  63 Netherlands Antilles* 35 163  96 Zambia 0 171           
31 Georgia 0 65  64 New Zealand* 97 156  97 Zimbabwe 0 123           
32 Ghana 82 165  65 Nicaragua 74 163                
33 Greece* 124 183  66 Oman 78 159                
                      
 Group total            13051    3057    1088 
 Total                    17196 
Note: Sample corresponding to column 1, Table 2. These countries either responded to the World Bank Census or they are very likely not to have an 
IPA. Those who responded to the Census gave the full timing (start and end year of the targeting) for at least one targeted sector, or they informed that 
did not practice sector targeting. (Sectors with incomplete timing information are excluded from the sample.) The column “Targeted” indicates the 
number of sector-years observations for the post-targeting period used in the estimation. “Total” is the total number of observations on the country 
included in the estimations. Developed countries, classified according to the World Bank definition as of July 1st 2006, are marked with an asterisk. 
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   Appendix Table 2: Sectors included in the analysis  
 
Sector  Number of observations  
Petroleum  1,370 
Utilities  526 
Food  1,353 
Chemicals  1,430 
Metals  1,435 
Machinery  1,389 
Electrical equipment  1,449 
Transportation equipment  1,429 
Wholesale trade  1,612 
Banking  1,186 
Other Finance  1,356 
Services  473 
ICT  445 
Professional services  491 
Other industries  1,252 
Total 17,196 
Note: The number of observations corresponds to the regression of 
column 1, Table 2. 
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Appendix Table 3: Aggregation across sectors and time, and matching Census sectors with BEA data 
Sector Targeted sectors matched BEA-data Aggregated Time period in BEA-data 
Petroleum Mining and Quarrying Petroleum  1989-1998 
  Mining  1999-2004 
     
Utilities Electricity, gas and water provision Utilities  1999-2004 
     
Food  
 
Food products Food and kindred products   
 
 1989-1998 
  Food  1999-2004 
     
Chemicals   Petroleum, chemical, rubber, plastic 
products 
Chemicals and allied products    1989-1998 
  Chemicals  1999-2004 
     
Metals Metal and metal products Primary and fabricated metals  1989-2004 
     
Machinery Machinery;  Computers and electronic 
equipment 
Industrial machinery and equipment  1989-1998 
  Machinery Yes 1999-2004 
  Computer and electronic products Yes 1999-2004 
     
Electrical 
equipment 
Computers and electronic equipment Electronic and other electric 
equipment 
 1989-1998 
  Electrical equipment, appliances, and 
components 
 1999-2004 
     
Transportation 
equipment   
Vehicles and other transport equipment Transportation equipment    1989-2004 
     
Wholesale 
trade 
Trade and repairs Wholesale trade  1989-2004 
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Appendix Table 3 cont.    
Sector Targeted sectors matched BEA-data Aggregated Time period in BEA-data 
Banking Financial intermediation; Back office 
services 
Banking  1989-1998 
  Depository institutions  1999-2004 
     
Other Finance Financial intermediation; Real estate and 
business activities; Back office services 
Finance (except banking), insurance 
and real estate 
 1989-1998 
  Finance (except depository 
institutions) and insurance 
 1999-2004 
     
Services Hotels and restaurants (until 1998); Real 
estate and business activities; Software; 
Biotechnology; Back office services 
Services  1989-1998 
     
ICT Transport and telecommunications (from 
1999); Real estate and business 
activities; Software; Back office services 
Information  1999-2004 
     
Professional 
services 
Software; Biotechnology Professional, scientific, and technical 
services 
 1999-2004 
     
Other industries Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry; 
Textiles and apparel;  Wood and wood 
products;  Construction;  Hotels and 
restaurants (from 1999);  Transport and 
telecommunications (until 1998) 
Other industries Yes 1989-2004 
  Other manufacturing Yes 1989-1998 
Note: Aggregated means that we have combined the sectors into one. 
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Appendix Table 4: Explaining the choice of sectors to be targeted. Probit. 
  All All All 
L.FDI flow -0.006   
 (0.005)   
L2.FDI flow  0.000  
  (0.005)  
L3.FDI flow   -0.008 
   (0.005) 
No. of observations 4274 4079 3842 
L.FDI stock 0.000   
 (0.005)   
L2.FDI stock  0.005  
  (0.005)  
L3.FDI stock   0.005 
   (0.006) 
No. of observations 4914 4295 4097 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 
1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is equal to one if country c 
begins targeting industry i at time t, and zero if the industry is not targeted at time t. LX 
means lagged X periods. Other controls include GDP per capita, population size, GDP 
growth, inflation, restrictions on civil liberties, country and year fixed effects. 
Population, GDP per capita, FDI flow and FDI stock enter in the log form. 
 
 
Appendix Table 5: Removing cases of targeting determined by 
previous success or failure in attracting FDI to the sector 
  All All All All 
Post targeting 0.866*    
 [0.488]    
L. Post targeting  1.373***   
  [0.514]   
L2. Post targeting   1.166**  
   [0.564]  
L3. Post targeting    0.839 
     [0.640] 
No. of observations 15285 15282 14750 14204 
No. of country-sector groups 1389 1389 1389 1387 
Within R-squared 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 
and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of inflow of US foreign direct 
investment into industry i in country c at time t. Post targeting is equal to one if industry i was 
targeted by country c at time t, and zero otherwise. LX means lagged X periods. All models 
include country-year, sector-year and country-sector fixed effects. 
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Appendix Table 6: Using US affiliate sales and employment as dependent variables 
 
  US affiliate sales US affiliate employment 
  Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing 
Post targeting 1.033***    0.520***    
 [0.363]    [0.143]    
L. Post targeting  1.096***    0.483***   
  [0.402]    [0.158]   
L2. Post targeting   1.054**    0.505***  
   [0.452]    [0.186]  
L3. Post targeting    1.164**    0.507** 
    [0.534]    [0.223] 
No. of observations 3087 3034 2976 2917 3360 3295 3227 3159 
No. of country-sector groups 227 226 225 225 233 233 233 233 
Within R-squared 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.39 
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent 
variable is the log of inflow of US foreign direct investment into industry i in country c at time t. Post targeting is equal to one if 
industry i was targeted by country c at time t, and zero otherwise. LX means lagged X periods. All models include country-year, 
sector-year and country-sector fixed effects. 
 
 
